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Introductory remarks
When in 1947 the poet João de Barro wrote that
Copacabana beach in Rio de Janeiro was nothing
less than the ‘Little Princess of the Sea’, the likes of
Pelé and Garrincha were still eleven years away, and
Fittipaldi, Piquet and Senna, even farther away in
time. Brazil had not yet made any impact on inter-
national football nor formula one. In fact, the coun-
try was only known internationally, if at all, for its
brand of coffee. However, Copacabana in the 1940s
and 1950s was already setting the trend in fashion
and culture, with celebrities up and down its famous
broadwalk, as simply immortalised by João de
Barro in his majestic, or even royal, description of
the beach.
Since then Brazil has become an eventful place
indeed; football, formula one, military dictatorship,
growth, political transition, democracy, populism,
hyperinflations, no growth, stabilisation, growth
again, a sociologist as president, then a former shoe-
shine boy as president, and obviously high inequality
at the background.1
No doubt the above illustrates that, for better or
worse, some change has taken place in Brazil. Well,
but this should not come as a surprise. According to
Acemoglu (2009), in his landmark textbook, eco-
nomic growth implies changes; new technologies
will substitute old ones, there will be social tensions,
with winners and losers, however overall there is
growth, which is supposed to be good for the major-
ity. Has Copacabana changed at all? Or is it still the
‘Little Princess of the Sea’ with its immutable royal
status quo?
Copacabana has changed, as well as Brazil. The coun-
try has been growing somehow consistently for the last
ten years or so. It is not like looking at the US nor UK
incomes per capita with their long-run increase in eco-
nomic welfare since the industrial revolution.
However, the country has now surpassed its own GDP
per capita of the early 1980s, therefore fully recovering
from the ‘lost decade’. As for Copacabana, it has
changed a lot too, it does not set the trend in fashion
anymore, one would have to go to Ipanema for that,
and the A celebrities do not stroll in the famous broad-
walk as it was their own private catwalk. Nevertheless,
an emerging middle class, direct descendants of the
poor, somehow obese (Brazilians are not known for
their politically correctness), wearing fake D&G sun-
glasses and other colourful garments, not to mention
the heavy intake of burgers with cold beer, are now
enjoying what Copacabana has to offer. A change has
indeed happened, and hopefully for good.
The remainder of this article deals firstly with how
inflation and public debt have behaved from the 1980s
onwards, and also with some monetary and fiscal poli-
cies issues. Change has happened there too, from
extreme macroeconomic instability and somehow lose
and irresponsible monetary and fiscal policies, to sta-
bility and economic pragmatism. Secondly, we take a
look at trade openness and financial development, two
variables that illustrate how much change has occurred
in a once closed and inefficient society to a more open,
competitive, and consequently market-oriented one.
Thirdly, we examine how economic growth and
inequality have been evolving over time, and the good
news is that with consistent growth, which tends to
trickle down, inequality can only go one way, and that
is downwards. Finally, we offer some concluding
remarks in which we highlight the importance of not
only keeping up with the current good work, but also
to start, once and for all, investing in infrastructure, so
that the lack of it does not become an impediment for
growth and prosperity in the very near future.
Inflation and debt
Brazil (and also a number of other South American
countries), had been known for presenting poor
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macroeconomic performance, in
particular, but not exclusively, in
terms of high inflation rates in
the 1980s and first half of the
1990s.2 In times that some would
criticise the implementation of
prudent and responsible mone-
tary and fiscal policies in devel-
oping countries, it is always
worth recalling that inflation in
Brazil reached a staggering
82 percent  per month in March
1990, and then 2,489 percent in
1993. In this respect Brazil was
indeed unique in South America
at the time, it presented not only
one, but two hyperinflationary
bursts!
All in all, the Brazilian inflation was persistently high
for almost 10 years (from 1985 to 1994), which is per-
haps a fine example of a ‘delayed stabilisation’
(Alesina and Drazen 1991), following the process of
political transition that took place between 1985 and
1989.3 During that time, a number of (heterodox) sta-
bilisation plans were implemented, the populist
Cruzado Plan, the Bresser Plan, the hot Verão Plan
and the colourful Collor Plan, not to mention the
process of redemocratisation itself. Stabilisation came
only in July 1994 with the implementation of the
(somewhat orthodox) Real Plan, and since then infla-
tion rates have been consistently low in Brazil. 
In terms of government size and public debt in gener-
al, what can be said is that the share of government in
the GDP in 2007 is not much bigger than it used to be
in the early 1980s. Many times though, as suggested
by Bruno and Easterly (1998), by just taking the aver-
ages we end up missing the short-run dynamics of
particular processes. In this case, the share of govern-
ment in the GDP presented a considerable increase in
the early 1990s, during the first hyperinflationary
burst of 1989/1990 and the on the run up to the sec-
ond burst of 1993/1994. However, after the stabilisa-
tion of 1994 it has returned to its long-run steady
state (around 20 percent of the GDP).
Moreover, public debt, after ballooning during the
hyperinflationary bursts of the 1980s and early 1990s,
was dramatically reduced during the stabilisation, just
to increase again during the late 1990s.4 However, it
has seen a slight reduction recently, although it is still
much higher than in the early 1980s, which is always a
cause for concern. Given its (erratic) nature during the
period, government debt still does not seem to have a
sort of long-run steady state
which to converge to. 
Basically Brazil has changed
(and is still changing), its institu-
tional framework with regards to
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GOVERNMENT SIZE AND PUBLIC DEBT, BRAZIL 1980–2007
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Figure 2
2 Other countries presenting a similar
macroeconomic pattern in South America
at the time include: Argentina, Bolivia,
Peru and Uruguay.
3 President Sarney, 1985 to 1989, although
a civilian, was not elected by popular vote,
but by an electoral college. The election of
President Collor by popular vote in 1989
somehow completed the political transi-
tion which was initiated in 1985.
4 In fact, public debt increased sharply
from 1985 onwards, which coincides with
the beginning of the democratic transi-
tion, or with the idea that new democra-
cies incur in higher deficits (Brender and
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instance, on the monetary side the Brazilian Central
Bank has not only improved considerably the quali-
ty of its technical staff, but has also implemented
inflation targeting since 1999.5 This is a significant
step forward in terms of implementing a particular
economic institution (more operational indepen-
dence to the Central Bank to implement particular
policies), which was simply unthinkable of back in
the 1980s.6
On the fiscal side, the Brazilian treasury has also
improved the quality of its personnel significantly.
More fundamentally though, it has implemented
towards the end of the 1990s fiscal responsibility laws
at federal and regional levels to considerably con-
straint the ability of running high public deficits,
which in turn tend to have a knock on effect on infla-
tion (Fischer 2005). 
Essentially, the above-mentioned institutional
framework implemented towards the turn of the
century, as simple as it is, has made, without any
exaggeration, a huge difference in terms of macro-
economic performance, or alternatively speaking, in
controlling the destructive forces of economic pop-
ulism (high public deficit and high inflation in an
unequal country that demands some redistribution),
so prevalent during the transition from military rule
to a more democratic framework seen in the 1980s
and first half of the 1990s in South America in gen-
eral, and in Brazil in particular
(Bittencourt 2010a).
Economic openness and financial
development
For all sorts of populist reasons
(import-substitution policies, aka
protection of particular vested
interests), Brazil (and South
America in general), has also
been known for being a relatively
closed and inefficient society.7
However, the share of exports
and imports to GDP has been
slowly but surely increasing over
time, at least since the early 1990s
when President Collor decided to open up the coun-
try, in particular to imported luxury cars, but not
only, to international competition. Even more impor-
tant, this process of openness has continued and even
furthered with time, with all its (positive) conse-
quences to technological diffusion, international com-
petition and enhanced economic efficiency.
Moreover, foreign direct investment in Brazil has sim-
ply ballooned after the stabilisation of 1994, although
it has seen a natural drop during the crisis of
2000–2002, just to recover again recently. In addition,
during the late 1990s the government implemented
some changes to the constitution of 1988 in which the
rules for foreign investment were somehow relaxed,
not to mention the process of privatisation of public
monopolies that took place during the same period,
which all facilitated investment of all sorts.
Overall, openness to trade and foreign direct invest-
ment have been on the rise during the last ten years or
so, and coincidentally enough the sharpest increase in
both indicators has taken place since the macroeco-
nomic stabilisation of 1994. This indicates the impor-
tance of a stable macroeconomic environment for
trade, investment and prosperity in general, and also
a degree of political maturity to actually implement
particular market-oriented policies which were con-
sidered taboo in Brazil during the eventful 1980s. 
In terms of financial development, Brazil has also
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OLS REGRESSION LINE BETWEEN INFLATION AND PUBLIC DEFICIT,
 BRAZIL  1980–2007
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5 The renovation that the Brazilian civil service has seen recently is
quite remarkable, and the Central Bank is no exception, with a
research department populated with a number of PhDs in econom-
ics from top international schools.
6 However, Carstens and Jácome (2005) warn that Brazil still has one
of the least independent central banks in Latin America, which is
always a cause for concern.
7 It is worth remembering that the import-substitution industrial pol-
icy that Brazil implemented in the 1940s was heavily dependant on
public monopolies which were insulated from international competi-
tion, and also on protection of particular private national interests.CESifo Forum 1/2011 14
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quite similar to the above. The benchmark measure of
financial development, the share of the liquid liabili-
ties to GDP (which we call M2), started from a timid
20 percent of the GDP in the early 1980s to reach a
much higher share of roughly 60 percent of the GDP
in 2007.8 Again, it is important to avoid the averages
and take a deeper look at what happened during the
late 1980s and early 1990s, when M2 presented an
erratic behaviour of ups and downs, certainly because
of the macroeconomic instability seen at the time.
Nevertheless, M2 played an important role during the
hyperinflationary bursts in terms of providing the
public, at least those with access to financial institu-
tions, with assets which provided even daily indexation
and therefore some protection against high inflation.
Even more importantly, the share of private credit to
GDP, a more sophisticated measure of how active the
financial sector is in actually allocating credit to private
entrepreneurs, has increased
sharply since the 1990s, which
somehow highlights once again
the importance of achieving a cer-
tain level of macroeconomic sta-
bility as a pre-condition for finan-
cial development (Bittencourt
2011). In addition, the financial
deregulation of the 1990s, which
introduced a certain degree of
competition in the financial mar-
ket, clearly played a role in creat-
ing some incentives for the finan-
cial institutions to actually per-
form their supposed duties.
The above trade openness and
financial development deregulation processes that
have been taking place in Brazil since stabilisation are
important not only because they illustrate environ-
mental and behavioural changes in how particular
policies, unthinkable of 25 years ago, are implement-
ed and even accepted by most, but also because some
would argue that more open and competitive societies
tend to growth faster (Lucas 2009), and also that
finance is an important determinant of economic
growth (Levine 2005 or Bittencourt 2010b).
Growth and inequality
In terms of GDP per capita (the main macroeco-
nomic measure for economic welfare), we can guess
by now that for obvious reasons during the hyperin-
flationary bursts of the 1980s and early 1990s
income per capita was considerably reduced (Fischer
1993), which in fact constitutes
the ‘lost decade’. However, in-
come per capita has been experi-
encing a consistent positive
trend since the macroeconomic
stabilisation of 1994, which
highlights once again the impor-
tance of macroeconomic stabili-
ty (or prudent and responsible
macroeconomic policies) in gen-
erating a stable, and conducive
to growth, environment.
Inequality, a much debated –
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TRADE OPENNESS AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT,
 BRAZIL 1980–2007
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FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT, BRAZIL 1980–2007
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Figure 5
8 For instance, in 2007 the share of the liq-
uid liabilities to GDP in the United States
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zilian problem, has also followed a very natural
trend, with sharp increases during the periods of
macroeconomic instability (Bittencourt 2009); the
poor are certainly the ones at
highest risk during hyperinfla-
tions for being unable to have
access to indexed financial assets
which could somehow protect
them against the full onslaught
of high inflation (via a process
of financial adaptation, see
Erosa and Ventura 2002). On the
other hand, and following the
same pos-stabilisation trend of
other variables before, inequali-
ty, as persistent as it is, has not
only initially converged to its
long-run steady state (a Gini
coefficient of .59), but also de-
creased to even lower and un-
precedented levels.
Ultimately, the macroeconomic
stabilisation, and all the institu-
tional reforms implemented, of
the 1990s has not only brought
down inflation for good, but also
presented a real impact on other
cyclical and structural variables.
The poor, no doubt, had to carry
the heavy weight of a decade of
high inflation and irresponsible
populism. However with stabili-
sation and particular simple eco-
nomic reforms such as trade
openness, deregulation of finan-
cial markets, privatisation and
end of inefficient public monopo-
lies, growth picked up again, and
coincidentally enough, inequality
has been falling to unprecedented
levels since then.9
The take home message in this
particular case is incredibly sim-
ple; macroeconomic stability,
combined with a certain degree
of political maturity, is, to say the
least, a necessary condition for
economic growth, and growth is
still the best and the most equi-
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OLS REGRESSION LINES BETWEEN GROWTH AND TRADE OPENNESS 
AND GROWTH AND PRIVATE CREDIT,  BRAZIL 1980–2007
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GDP PER CAPITA AND INEQUALITY, BRAZIL 1980–2007
a) Inequality
Gini coefficient
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9 Some would argue that the new welfare system being implemented
in Brazil is also behind the recent reduction in inequality. However,
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Concluding observations
In this article we have seen how some macroeconom-
ic variables and indicators have been performing in
Brazil since the 1980s. Basically, we argue that Brazil
has come a long way since the convoluted 1980s and
early 1990s, with a number of disruptive events hap-
pening before macroeconomic stabilisation was final-
ly achieved in 1994. Moreover, we argue forcibly that
macroeconomic stabilisation (and the institutional
framework that accompanies it), has been the pre-
condition for increased economic openness and for-
eign direct investment, financial development, eco-
nomic growth and much lower inequality.
No less important, the country has also been an
example in terms of political maturity, with different
political parties alternating in power as in any mature
democracy. All the same, economic stabilisation com-
bined with political maturity (which is also a fine
example of what causes what), are at the heart of
what Brazil has achieved in terms of institutional
reforms, economic policies, and obviously better out-
comes recently (Acemoglu et al. 2008).
However, although Brazil has been on the right track
for the last ten years or so, anecdotal evidence sug-
gests that the public infrastructure is crumbling.
Those visiting the country recently could not avoid
seeing the sorry state of airports, ports and roads in
general, not to mention the national grid and the col-
lapse of the Itaipu dam recently. In addition, govern-
ment consumption has been on the rise for twenty
years or so now, and public investment has not really
kept with the Joneses (Adrogué et al. 2006). All the
same, the lack of infrastructure in a country which is
displaying growth of the private sector is worrying,
since at some point bottlenecks might arise, and it
would be a pity to stop the prosperity because of
infrastructure glitches.
To conclude, Copacabana, like most modern monar-
chies, has evolved and adapted for its own survival,
and it is now a much more representative place which
accommodates a much broader spectrum of the
Brazilian population (perhaps a sign of a more equal-
itarian society), which makes her, as immortalised by
the Poet, the ‘Little Princess of the Sea’.
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